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Abstract 
Conflict minerals refer to raw materials associated with conflicts and human rights violations in 
conflict zones around the world.  Concern about the lack of transparency in the mineral supply chains 
of global corporations has led to increased stakeholder concern and pressure through protest action. In 
particular since 2009, numerous public-private collaborations, including collaborations with NGOs 
and industry-led initiatives, have sought greater transparency in companies’ sourcing from conflict 
mineral zones. This has led to the enactment of the ‘Dodd-Frank Act’ in the US to regulate the 
disclosure of involvement in conflict minerals. This requirement suggests that corporate obligations 
now go beyond their own operations and that companies are held accountable for the actions of their 
suppliers with regards to their supply chains.  
While the act requires minimum disclosure by companies, we hypothesise that companies’ 
collaboration with social movement NGOs and activist protests against companies will influence the 
comprehensiveness of their conflict mineral disclosures. Our hypothesis is grounded in social 
movement theory and the theory of collaboration. We test our hypothesis by focusing on a sample of 
global electronic reliant companies from 20 countries.  Consistent with our expectations, we find that 
collaboration with NGOs (as social movement organizations) and activist protest lead to more 
comprehensive, and therefore more transparent, disclosures.  Our findings suggest that in the presence 
of activist protest, NGO collaboration with corporations has a higher impact on the 
comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosures. Furthermore, the marginal effects on disclosure 
are more strongly driven by NGO collaboration than activist protest.  Our findings have practical and 
policy implications in that improved corporate transparency is the result of social movement actions 
via NGOs, i.e., regulation on its own may not result in comprehensive disclosures. 
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1. Introduction  
Across different industries and countries, there is widespread stakeholder concern over 
human rights violations in the supply chains of multi-national corporations sourcing from 
overseas, including in the conflict zones of Africa. Electronic reliant industries attract more 
attention, as their supply chains often include conflict minerals (Lezhnev and Hellmuth, 
2012).2  In particular, lack of transparency about the origin of many consumer products sold 
has fuelled opposition to economic globalization and to present accountability practices 
(Mansfield and Mutz, 2013; Bregman et al., 2015). There is pressure from stakeholders, 
including Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), for more transparent supply chains 
(Chen and Slotnick, 2015). In particular since 2009, numerous public-private collaborations, 
including collaborations with NGOs and industry-led initiatives, have sought greater 
transparency from companies who are sourcing from conflict mineral zones (Reinecke and 
Ansari, 2016; Lezhnev and Hellmuth, 2012; New, 2010). At a broader level, NGO 
collaborations with corporations appear to have a significant impact on solving particular 
social or environmental problems, and research focussing on NGO-Corporation collaboration 
within the domain of the management and social science literature is growing (Austin, 2000; 
Rondinelli and London, 2003; Mandell, 1999).  However, the collaborative role of NGOs 
with the aim to influence corporate human rights (social) transparency, and associated 
disclosures, remains under investigated (e.g., Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2016; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2015). 
Human rights violations in supply chains range from human trafficking, child and 
slave labour, to lack of transparency in supply chains (Grootaert and Patrinos, 1999; 
Psacharopoulos, 1997; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2002; Haltsonen et al., 2007; World Bank, 
2009; UN, 2008; Moodie, 2014) and have caused broad community concern (see for 
example, Kolk and Van Tulder, 2002; Shelton and Wachter, 2005; UN Global Compact, 
2011; Kettis, 2009; Verbruggen et al., 2011).  Our investigation deals with a new regulatory 
dimension of corporate responsibility, the ‘Dodd-Frank Act’ and in particular section 1502 of 
this act, which requires US listed companies to file an annual conflict mineral report with the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). This act suggests that the obligation of corporations 
goes beyond their own operations and they are held accountable for the actions of their 
                                                          
2 The term ‘Conflict Minerals’ refers to raw materials that come from a particular part of the world where 
conflict is occurring that affects the mining (in that mining conditions are inhuman and life threatening) and 
trading (in that returns are used to finance conflicts) of those materials. 
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suppliers with regards to their supply chains.  In this paper we are particularly interested to 
understand the influence of social movement actions on the comprehensiveness of corporate 
disclosures to the SEC in relation to conflict minerals.3  While we specifically examine the 
influence of NGO collaboration on the comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosures, we 
also investigate whether activist protests influence disclosure practice in this area and interact 
with NGO collaboration to influence conflict mineral disclosure practices. Prior research 
found that legitimacy threatening incidents (see for example, Patten, 1992; Milne and Patten, 
2002; Coetzee and Van Staden, 2011), stakeholder concerns, including protests (e.g., Islam 
and Deegan, 2008; Deegan and Islam, 2014), and media pressures (Brown and Deegan, 1998; 
Aerts and Cormier, 2009), influence corporate responsiveness, including disclosure 
responsiveness. Our focus on NGO protest (Kneip, 2013; King, 2008) is in line with research 
that consider the relationship between broader stakeholder concerns and corporate 
disclosures.  While prior social movement and organisational research have focussed on how 
NGOs influence companies through protest as well as collaboration (see for example, De 
Bakker et al., 2013, Kneip, 2013; King and Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Soule and King, 2006), 
NGOs’ roles to improve corporate social transparency and disclosures have received little 
attention.  Whether and how corporate transparency and disclosure practices is influenced by 
the interaction between NGO collaboration and activist protest remains the most neglected 
part of the research.  
Since the enactment of the Act, debates over disclosure have ensued (Taylor, 2014). 
At the heart of the arguments is the question of what information matters to investors and 
what mechanism is best suited to ensure that the right ‘mix’ of information is provided at the 
least cost to the system (Taylor, 2014). However, this is a unique situation as this appears to 
be the first Act in the US history that marks a major shift in the SEC's traditional role as a 
market regulator of financially material information (Nelson, 2014). Despite criticism from 
industry representatives, section 1502 requires disclosure regardless of materiality to the 
shareholders (Nelson, 2014). The rise of socially responsible stakeholders (including NGOs) 
has resulted in a significant paradigm shift away from accounting only for financial 
information, to more transparency on issues of human rights and social responsibility 
(Nelson, 2014). This also gives researchers a platform to reinforce the application of socially 
driven theoretical frameworks in explaining corporate disclosures (see for example, Deegan 
                                                          
3 In this paper we refer to NGOs as social movement organisations and therefore our focus is social movement 
NGOs working in the area of conflict minerals.    
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and Blomquist, 2006; Cho et al., 2015; Cho and Patten, 2007; Cannizzaro and Weiner, 2015) 
rather than conventional market based or shareholder driven theoretical models (e.g., 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012).  
Our study is motivated by the debate over the comprehensiveness and transparency of 
corporate disclosures. Even if a disclosure is mandated by law, management still has 
discretion on how comprehensively it will be addressed (see for example, De Villiers and 
Van Staden, 2011; Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Wallace and Naser, 1996). In the case of 
conflict mineral disclosures, the Act requires minimum mandatory disclosures in relation to 
conflict minerals. In relation to the comprehensiveness of the disclosures, the Act largely 
remains silent, which raises questions about the comprehensiveness of the resulting 
disclosures. We take the view that while the act requires minimum disclosure, NGO activities 
are influencing the comprehensiveness of corporate disclosure responses. We therefore 
expect (and find) variations in the disclosures between companies. We find that collaboration 
with NGOs (as social movement organizations) and activist protest lead to more 
comprehensive, and therefore more transparent, disclosures. We also find that the interaction 
between NGO collaboration and protest action has a significant effect on disclosure. Our 
findings suggest that both collaboration and protest influence disclosure, but, after taking into 
account the scale of the two influences, collaboration tends to be more important. Our 
findings therefore suggest that social movement actions (collaboration and protest) through 
NGOs, improve corporate transparency and accountability.  
The paper provides a valuable contribution by using both social movement theory 
(King and Soule, 2007) and collaboration theory (Wood and Gray, 1991) to examine 
influences on conflict mineral disclosures. While prior accounting studies have examined 
social disclosures, they relied on legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory and tend to be 
mostly qualitative (see, reviews within Deegan, 2002; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; De 
Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Deegan, 2014).  Consequently, prior studies produced case 
based descriptive results that are mostly not generalizable. Given the lack of sufficient 
explanatory power in stakeholder theory (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; King, 2008), and the 
lack of specificity of legitimacy theory (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2016) we use social 
movement theory and collaboration theory to develop expectations about the influence of 
protest and collaboration on the comprehensiveness of corporate conflict mineral disclosures. 
Based on the joint consideration of social movement theory and collaboration theory, our 
contribution to the literature is the notion that in an attempt to create social accountability, 
collaboration with NGOs (Rondinelli and London, 2003) occur as a response to stakeholder 
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pressures or extra institutional forces such as ‘protest’ towards the companies, and such 
collaboration in turn influence corporate social transparency and disclosures.   
Within the social science literature, prior research investigated social movements as 
non-market forces (e.g., Davis et al., 2008) or as collaborations contributing to influence state 
policy and corporate policy and procedures. Despite the significant roles of NGOs in creating 
corporate human rights accountability, there is a lack of studies within the accounting 
literature that investigate and explain the influence of NGOs on corporate human rights 
transparency and associated disclosure practices (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2016; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2015).  We respond in particular to the call by 
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2016) for further research to investigate corporate reporting on 
human rights. We are motivated by the findings of O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer (2015) that the 
NGO movement evoked a progression in social responsibility reporting in the banking sector. 
Despite the more prevalent and ongoing NGO involvement in the electronic reliant sector, 
there is so far little academic attention to address corporate responsiveness in this sector.  
Improved transparency regarding conflict minerals can play an important role in 
reducing human rights violations in supply chains.  We use US listed companies since this is 
the only jurisdiction at the time of our study where conflict mineral disclosures are required. 
However, we do not present this as a US centred study and include companies from a number 
of other countries that are listed in the USA. We are of the opinion that our results could 
apply to any country that implement similar legislation, e.g., the UK Modern Slavery Act of 
2015 and the EU Conflict Minerals regulation of 2017. In this regard we show that our results 
are generalizable across countries.  
The paper is laid out as follows. In the next part conflict minerals and efforts to reveal 
and remove the impact are discussed, followed by a discussion of corporate accountability in 
the supply chain in conflict zones and the contribution to the accounting and disclosure 
research literature. The theoretical framework and hypotheses are then developed. This is 
followed by the research methods where the measures are discussed and motivated, followed 
by the results and the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Conflict minerals and efforts to reveal and remove the impacts 
The exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originated in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC).  The extreme violence and human rights violations in the DRC have resulted 
in a loss of more than 5.4 million lives since it was instigated in the late 1990’s (Global 
Witness, 2011; Hogg, 2012). For years, rebels have illegally mined minerals and sold them to 
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multinational companies (MNCs) to fund their war efforts in the DRC (Global Witness, 
2011). It is mostly companies within the electronics reliant industries which activists and 
NGOs accuse of fuelling or financing armed groups in the DRC and activists have been 
campaigning to get companies to remove conflict minerals from their supply chains 
(Verbruggen et al., 2011).  In producing countries, mineral-related legislation is rarely 
executed or enforced (BSR, 2010). This is because of massive human rights violations, 
corruption, insufficient political will and a lack of capacity and infrastructure as well as 
power imbalances (e.g., unequal negotiating capacities between communities, smaller 
producing nations and MNCs) in these countries while non-existent borders make illicit 
minerals flow easily (Moodie, 2014; BSR, 2010). 
Generally, there is concern over irresponsible supply chain practices across industries 
ranging from the clothing industry, mining industry to the electronic reliant industries 
(AFLCIO, 2011; Haltsonen et al.,  2007; Bachman, 2000; Spar, 1998; Wah, 1998; OneWorld 
US, 2006; Share, 2011; ILO, 2005; UN Global Compact, 2011; Carpenter, 2012; Amnesty 
International, 2015). Within the electronic reliant industries, there is even greater stakeholder 
concern over the use of conflict minerals from the DRC in particular. The United States 
Geological Survey (USGS, 2010) indicates that the DRC is the world’s conflict mineral 
supplier with the greatest percentages of 3T elements (tin, tantalum, tungsten). The four main 
conflict minerals are being mined in the DRC (the 3Ts and gold) and most of these minerals 
eventually present or wind up in electronic devices produced by the electronic based 
industries (USGS, 2010). Many electronic related companies are suspected of incorporating 
these elements directly and/or indirectly through their complex supply chains and it is a 
challenge for regulatory bodies and auditors to identify and control (Matthews, 2013).  
There are various NGOs dedicated either entirely to the DRC or devoting a significant 
part of their work to end the use of conflict minerals. In relation to conflict minerals, NGOs 
working in the area includes Falling Whistles, Global Witness, Raise Hope for Congo, 
Free2Work, and Conflict Free Sourcing Initiatives.  While one group of NGOs campaign and 
protest against irresponsible corporate behaviour, another group collaborate with companies 
to help eliminate irresponsible behaviour. For example, Raise Hope for Congo independently 
campaign against companies in order to end the use of conflict minerals. As a subdivision of 
the ‘Enough’ project, which aims to stop and prevent genocide, Raise Hope for Congo works 
with both Congolese and international organizations, like Amnesty International (Carpenter, 
2012).  It seeks to increase the prominence of the conflict in the media, offering individuals 
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information and a number of possibilities to get involved.4 Knowledge of the conflict is on 
the rise in the public eye, causing pressure on policy makers and companies involved 
(Carpenter, 2012). On the other hand, an example of a NGO that collaborate with companies 
is Conflict Free Sourcing Initiatives (CFSI). CFSI is a multi-stakeholder initiative that 
collaborate with companies as monitor and/or inspector in an attempt to bring about change 
by helping companies to ensure transparency in (conflict mineral) supply chains and to 
enable the sourcing of conflict free minerals.5 The collaborations also focus on whether and 
to what extent concerned companies implement existing norms and laws (such as the Dodd-
Frank Act) in relation to conflict minerals.  
Over the last decade, due to the activism of social movement NGOs, the UN 
appointed panels of experts to investigate the exploitation of resources in the DRC (Leader, 
2008), while the EU appointed representatives to review the trade of conflict minerals (Reese, 
2010).  In the US, social movements via NGOs and civil rights organizations supported the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010). This Act is one of the most visible initiatives coming out of campaigns by 
NGOs and social movements. On 16 July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed by Congress 
and on 22 August 2012, the SEC adopted Section 1502. 
The provision on conflict minerals contained in the Section 1502 of the Act, obliges 
companies that trade on US stock exchanges and are implicated in their supply chains 
through the use of tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold, to apply due diligence and make 
recommended disclosures.  
 
3. Corporate accountability in the supply chain in conflict zones 
The Dodd Frank Act is the first act to deal with conflict minerals. The purpose of the Act is to 
further the humanitarian goal of ending violent conflict in the DRC and the adjoining region, 
which includes Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (Covered Countries).6 The Act 
requires disclosures to promote the exercise of due diligence on the source of conflict 
minerals in supply chains and to encourage companies to procure conflict minerals from 
sources that do not finance or benefit armed groups in the Covered Countries. The aim of the 
Act is not to ban the use of conflict minerals, but to create greater transparency and 
                                                          
4 See http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/about/about-the-campaign and Raise Hope for Congo (2010). 
5 See (http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/about. 
6 See http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171562058. 
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responsible sourcing among companies. Section 1502 requires companies to file certain 
reports with the SEC to provide annual disclosures with regards to conflict minerals used in 
their products by 31 May 2014 for the first time (covering products manufactured starting 1 
January 2013).  The Section requires disclosures every 31 May thereafter that will cover 
products manufactured in the previous calendar year. 
More specifically, under Section 1502, companies are required to determine if any of 
their manufactured products contain conflict minerals. Companies must perform a reasonable 
country of origin inquiry to determine whether minerals originated in the DRC or its 
neighbouring countries (OECD, 2011; Bowman, 2013, 2014; Ernst and Young, 2012) and 
can therefore be regarded as conflict minerals. Companies must disclose a description of the 
measures taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of supply – this should 
include a description of the due diligence process, including whether any recognized 
standards or guidance were used, and the facilities used to process minerals and the efforts 
undertaken to determine the mine or location of origin (SEC, 2012). If it can be established 
that the minerals do not originate from the DRC regions, the company is not required to file a 
conflict minerals report. However, if the minerals originate from the DRC regions or if the 
origin of the minerals is unclear, the company will be required to file a conflict minerals 
report, including an independent private sector audit (Ernst and Young, 2012). In the event 
that the origin is unclear, companies are allowed to classify the mineral as ‘undeterminable’ 
and describe the due diligence process used to determine the origin of the minerals. If a 
company files an inaccurate conflict minerals report, it could face financial penalties under 
the Securities Exchange Act (SEC, 2012).  Furthermore, the language in the law imply that 
any company with raw material supply chains overseas may be subject to the disclosure 
regulations and the Act has not established a materiality threshold that would preclude the 
applicability of the reporting requirements.7 
According to the SEC rule (section 1502), the due diligence process requires 
companies to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address any adverse human 
rights impacts.  The UN’s ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, indicates that ‘the process should include assessing actual and potential 
human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and 
communicating how impacts are addressed’(Ruggie, 2011, p.16). In contexts where there is a 
                                                          
7 See the Federal Register (2010) on this link: https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63547fr.pdf, last 
viewed March 31, 2017.  
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risk of contributing to conflict, risk-based due diligence is necessary to address potential and 
actual risks, and to mitigate the adverse impacts of activity and/or sourcing (OECD, 2011). 
The SEC has instructed companies to use a nationally or internationally recognized due 
diligence framework, such as the Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains from the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Hochfelder, 2014). Due 
diligence is very important because it is an on-going, proactive and reactive process through 
which companies can ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to conflict 
(OECD, 2013). The structure of the OECD’s due diligence in the supply chain process is as 
follows OECD (2013): 
 Establish strong company management systems 
 Identify and assess risk in the supply chain 
 Design and implement a strategy to respond to identified risks 
 Carry out independent third-party audit of supply chain due diligence at identified 
points in the supply chain 
 Report on supply chain due diligence 
The SEC’s suggestion to use the due diligence process is a qualitative and voluntary 
guideline and there will therefore be variations between companies adopting the due 
diligence process.  
However, there is concern about the application of the Section and also claims that 
many companies have failed to do the minimum required by the Section (Amnesty 
International, 2015). De Villiers and Van Staden (2011, p.512) argue that managers choose to 
disclose varying volumes of both discretionary and mandatory disclosures, while Wallace and 
Naser (1996) find that there are cross-sectional variation in the comprehensiveness of 
mandatory information contained in corporate annual reports. Furthermore, the legal 
consequences of poor conflict minerals filings have yet to be tested. Similar to other filing 
requirements, the SEC can sanction companies that file false and misleading conflict mineral 
reports or fail to file a report when one is required. The SEC has the power to delist a 
company from the stock exchange, but this is used extremely rarely and only against repeat 
offenders (Amnesty International, 2015).   
From this perspective, we do not know much about the consequence of failing to meet 
the Section 1502 requirements or how comprehensively companies choose to disclose on 
conflict minerals. Investigating the role of NGOs in influencing more comprehensive conflict 




4. Prior research and contributions of this study 
Prior research has examined how market or shareholder expectations (Ness and Mirza, 1991; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012), regulators (Frost, 2007), media (Deegan et al., 2002; Islam and 
Deegan, 2010), NGOs (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2015), and 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) (Islam and McPhail, 2011) influence different types 
of corporate social and environmental disclosures. We extend the prior research by looking at 
whether and how NGOs influence the comprehensiveness of a specific type of corporate 
disclosure, i.e., supply chain disclosures in relation to the use of conflict minerals, or simply 
conflict mineral disclosures.  
Prior accounting literature that looked at supply chains mainly investigated 
management accounting practices within the supply chain (Frances and Garnsey, 1996; 
Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003; Seal et al., 2004; Free, 2008; Bhimani and Ncube, 2006; 
Gosman and Kohlbeck, 2009; Neu et al., 2014). Prior management accounting research in 
particular focussed on trust and buyer-supplier relationships while pursuing economic gains 
(see for example, Free, 2008), cost-benefit analysis of external supply alliances (see for 
example, Bhimani and Ncube, 2006), coordination and control in low-price production chains 
(see for example, Neu et al., 2014) and how buyer power in the retail market affects 
suppliers’ profitability (see for example, Gosman and Kohlbeck, 2009). Spence and Rinaldi 
(2014) show that retailers are effective in shaping the governance of supply chains. In other 
words, sustainability governance and control is found to transcend the corporate boundaries 
of MNC supply chains and extend to indirect governance of suppliers. Islam and Deegan 
(2010), by focusing on the social disclosures of two MNCs, provide an understanding of 
social disclosures by MNCs in relation to their supply chains. Both financial accounting and 
the voluntary disclosure literature have paid little attention to the supply chain. There is 
widespread global attention on the disclosures, transparency and accountability in supply 
chains and some stakeholders have put pressure on companies to be visible and transparent 
on the working conditions, including human trafficking, in their supply chains. Despite this, 
research investigating whether and how companies disclose human rights performance and 
associated transparency measures in the supply chain is scant.  The limited research is also 
acknowledged by an insightful review of the literature by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2016, p. 
38): ‘...numerous issues central to social sustainability, such as reporting on human rights, 
supply chain abuses, and fair trade, have received limited attention in AOS’. 
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The rise of socially responsible stakeholders and a major shift in the regulator’s (the 
SEC) traditional role as a regulator of financially material information to non-financial (social 
and environmental) information appears to question market based arguments for social and 
environmental reporting and performance.  Accounting research, using non-market based 
arguments, investigating whether and how external actors or secondary stakeholders to the 
organizations influence organizational social and environmental disclosure practices is 
growing (see for example, Patten, 2002; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Cooper and Owen, 
2007; Islam and Deegan, 2008, 2010; Deegan and Islam, 2014). Given the lack of a direct 
voice in corporate decision making, external or secondary stakeholders must find other means 
such as protest and/or collaboration to influence corporate change, including disclosure 
related change.  However, there is limited research that investigates whether NGOs influence 
corporate disclosure practices. Within the sociology literature, the role of NGOs and social 
movement organizations in influencing organizational operating practices (including 
organizational policy, procedures and even actions) is well researched (see for example, 
Davis et al., 2008). While the NGO movement is studied in the sociology literature, 
disclosure is not considered as an issue of this research.  
Accounting research on social responsibility reporting is dominated by legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory, focussing mainly on the need for legitimacy and potential 
insights for policy implications (Deegan, 2014; Unerman and Chapman, 2014). We argue that 
NGOs’ influence on disclosure regulation and their subsequent monitoring of corporate 
actions cannot be explained by legitimacy theory, following the criticism by O’Dwyer and 
Unerman (2016) that everything can be explained by legitimacy theory and therefore it does 
not provide enough insight into corporate accountability and transparency. Furthermore, 
NGOs as actors of corporate legitimation have so far not been well explained by researchers 
who used legitimacy theory (with the possible exception of Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). As 
NGOs can be considered as secondary stakeholders of corporations, stakeholder theory can 
be utilized to analyse NGOs’ influence on corporate disclosure practices (Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006). However, critics argue that stakeholder theory (in particular with regards 
to social movements) is not sufficiently explanatory and is not able to identify causal linkages 
whereby secondary stakeholders, such as social movement organisations (i.e., NGOs), exert 
pressure and influence change (King, 2008).  
Prior research within accounting and disclosure have looked at the role of NGOs to 
understand their influence on corporate social and environmental performance and associated 
disclosure practices (see for example, Deegan and Blomquist, 2006 and Deegan and Islam, 
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2014). Deegan and Blomquist showed how the WWF Australia was able to influence the 
reporting requirements incorporated within the Australian mineral industry’s environmental 
performance code. The study also showed that senior executives of the mineral industry 
responded to the WWF’s sanctioning of the performance code to maintain legitimacy. 
Deegan and Islam (2014) find that NGOs have a role to create corporate accountability and 
disclosure practices. They show that NGOs use the news media to create accountability 
practices in a developing nation connected with international trade. O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer 
(2015) examined the roles of social movement NGOs to create social accountability 
surrounding the Equator Principles within the banking industry. They found NGO 
movements focusing on socially responsible finance triggered changes in the social 
accountability and reporting behaviour in the banking industry. There is research focusing on 
NGOs’ accountability to meet their social objectives (see for example, O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2008; Martinez and Cooper, 2017), without necessarily focusing on corporations. 
Some of this research found that NGOs as social movement organisations have been 
disarticulated due to economic influences and ‘NGOization’ (Martinez and Cooper, 2017).  
We find that prior research that investigated the role of NGOs to influence particular 
corporate disclosures, did not focus on NGOs and their collaborations with companies in 
relation to the creation of corporate transparency within global supply chains. While the 
organisational literature considers how NGOs influence companies through protest and 
collaboration (i.e., De Bakker et al., 2013; King and Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Soule and 
King, 2006), whether and how the interaction between NGO collaboration and activist protest 
create corporate social transparency and accountability has not received attention in this 
literature.   
In fact there is not much research in accounting that investigate NGOs’ role in 
influencing corporate disclosures (see only, Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Deegan and Islam, 
2014 and Tilt, 1994), and this consists of case studies and did not attempt to generalise the 
influence of NGOs on particular corporate disclosures. There is also a complete lack of 
hypothesis driven empirical studies as acknowledged by Deegan and Blomquist (2006) that 
explores the influence of NGOs on corporate disclosures. More specifically, given the lack of 
explanatory power in stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, and based on social 
movement theory, we develop hypotheses driven conceptual arguments about the influence of 
social movements, being (extra-) institutional forces (such as NGO protest, boycott or 
collaboration) on corporate disclosure behaviour.  
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We make the following contributions to the literature: first we observe that external 
forces such as protest and collaboration (by NGOs as agents of social movement 
organizations) influence corporate disclosure practices, in particular the comprehensiveness 
of conflict mineral disclosure practices. In other words, this study contributes to the literature 
by empirically showing how NGO collaborations with companies and activist protest 
influence particular corporate disclosures. These NGO activities are rarely examined in the 
disclosure literature.  Second, while prior research sees the issue of the environment and 
working conditions as central to the analysis of the roles of NGOs, we investigate the role of 
NGOs in influencing the comprehensiveness of disclosure and transparency in relation to 
human rights and the elimination of conflict minerals from supply chains. Third, NGOs’ role 
in one industry is different from their roles in other industries. While prior research looked at 
the roles of NGOs in influencing company disclosures and accountability within the mineral 
industry (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006), the clothing and retail industry (Deegan and Islam, 
2014) and the banking industry (O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2015), we focus on disclosure 
practices within the electronic reliant industries. Companies in this industry face a major 
social problem, i.e., conflict minerals in their supply chains. The regulation requiring 
disclosure to the SEC offers a unique opportunity to investigate the influence of NGOs in 
these circumstances. Fourth, no-one so far looked at NGOs that collaborate with companies 
in order to improve transparency and accountability and the associated disclosure practices in 
relation to supply chains. Fifth and most importantly, this study uses social movement theory 
and the concept of collaboration to explain the notion of influence by NGOs which is 
different from the notion of influence explained in other studies.  NGOs, via their activism 
(protests, campaigns and/or social movements), influenced the regulatory agency (i.e., the US 
SEC) to incorporate minimum disclosure requirements/regulations (for example, section 1502 
of the Dodd Frank Act). Activist protest also influenced corporate change, encouraging 
corporates to collaborate with NGOs.  NGOs formed collaborations with companies either to 
monitor or to implement the regulations and the disclosure requirements. We expect variation 
in the comprehensiveness of corporate disclosures depending on the level of NGO 
collaboration and activist protest, and the interactions between these.  
 
5. NGOs as social movement actors and the corporate response: a theoretical 
framework and hypotheses 
We use social movement theory and the theory of collaboration to explore factors that 
influence the comprehensiveness of corporate disclosures in relation to conflict minerals. The 
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theoretical framework in particular leads to hypotheses in relation to how institutional forces 
such as NGOs (through their collaboration and/or protest) influence the comprehensiveness 
of conflict mineral disclosures by global electronic reliant companies listed on US stock 
exchanges. Literature on social movement theory has been used by sociologists to understand 
organizational behaviour. Based on a review, Davis et al. (2008) argue that social movement 
theory has only recently spread into mainstream organizational studies. The theory can not 
only go beyond conventional explanations to reveal new insights, but can also open up new 
areas of inquiry (Davis et al., 2008). While earlier research by social movement scholars has 
focused almost exclusively on outcomes in the political domain, Davis et al. (2008) have 
emphasized the importance of looking at additional types of outcomes by giving attention to 
social movements that target companies and other business organizations. Given the central 
role that business organizations play in contemporary society, it is curious that both social 
movement scholars and accounting scholars have not yet considered the influence of social 
movements on disclosure transparency.  
In the literature, the construct of social movement is found in the early work by 
Davies (1962), Gurr (1970), Toch (1965), Oberschall (1973), Tilly (1978) and Jenkins, 
(1983). Early social movement literature concentrated on causes (for example, Davies, 1962) 
and motivations (see for example, Toch, 1965) behind the social movements.  Things have 
changed over the last two decades and social movements are now regarded as a cause for 
organizational change (see Davis et al., 2008; Soule, 2012).  An important focus of social 
movement research has been the investigation of the modernisation of collective actions by 
Tilly (1978). Based on Tilly (1978), social movement theory comes from a central idea that 
social movement organizations, including NGOs, develop from their responsive actions to 
long term pre-emptive actions for the purpose of social development, or to create change to a 
way of life. The theory posits that social movement organizations can impact policy decisions 
at the state, local, national (Soule et al., 1999; Soule and King, 2006) and international levels. 
Social movements thus target existing systems of authority, such as the state, educational 
institutions and companies (King and Soule, 2007). Davis et al. (2008) argue that social 
movement research should be extended from the investigation of movements that are state 
centred to movements that are corporate-centred, but at the same time they believe that the 
research must explicitly take into account various kinds of institutional and extra-institutional 
activities (protest, boycott and collaboration) that play important roles in constraining and 
facilitating the influence of social movements on organizations and markets. The theory 
highlights the strength of supportive social movement organizations through their capacity to 
14 
 
mobilise forces such as protest, lobbying and collaboration to influence policymakers (Soule 
and King, 2006) as well as the actors in the organization on which policy is imposed.  
Social movements tend to challenge dominant institutions (states, corporations, or 
international bodies) and institutional arrangements (such as regulations, corporate codes of 
conduct, or other global and institutional norms and principles) (O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 
2015).  Social movement theory suggests that movements with a greater organizational 
capacity will be more effective than those lacking a strong organizational infrastructure 
(Soule and King, 2006).  In her study, Soule (2009) provides some interesting cases of the 
implications of social movement organizations. She describes US activist attempts in the 
1970s and 1980s to reinforce state regulation in the tuna fishing industry in an effort to 
decrease the number of dolphin deaths associated with the use of purse-seine nets. In another 
study, Soule (2012) argues that there has been a rise of private regulatory agencies (including 
NGOs) that certify corporate conduct and supply chains. She explains, for example, that the 
Forest Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council and Social Accountability 
International have all formed in recent years as private regulatory agencies which are mostly 
NGOs designated to monitor and certify products and supply chains.   
O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer (2015) provide an understanding of how NGO movements 
fuelled an evolution in the social accountability and reporting in the banking sector. They 
argue that when new issues arise (i.e., the SEC’s conflict mineral disclosure rules), actors 
such as NGOs may use their powerful field positions to create change in accountability. As 
O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, (2015, p.47) argue: 
‘…..when mature field disruption or uncertainty arises because of a new issue of concern 
arising from outside the mature field  - in our case, the issue of socially accountable finance 
advocated by an external NGO movement - these central actors use their powerful field 
positions to address the issue by instigating change that meets the conditions of the mature 
field’.   
As companies shift their operations and/or sourcing of materials overseas, NGOs’ 
roles as social movement organizations extend across national boundaries. Davis et al. (2008) 
argue that in an increasingly global economy, social movements are growing more 
transnational. NGOs, through their activities and changed strategies, create concern over 
human rights violations at companies’ foreign operations. In response to this, more and more 
companies are changing their behaviour, this notion is ingrained in social movement theory. 
Davis et al. (2008) argue that social movements’ approach to changing corporate behaviour 
range from sabotage to collaboration. Social movements address large-scale social problems 
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in two primary ways. First, activists can influence corporate operating practices via protests 
and/or boycotts and second, NGOs can directly engage in collaboration to influence corporate 
activities and accountability practices.  Put simply, NGOs influence companies through 
protest campaigns as well as collaborative partnership (De Bakker et al., 2013). In this regard, 
Davis et al. (2008) found that some organizations learn to tolerate and even work or 
collaborate with social movements that initially appeared to threaten their interests. They 
observe that important engagements between organizations and social movements are 
occurring in transnational contexts around the issues of global economic development, 
environmental protection and sustainability and even the dark side of transnational dynamics 
such as terrorism and struggles for social justice and equity. While the notion of protest by 
social movement organisations has been studied (see for example, King, 2008; King and 
Soule, 2007), the notion of social movement collaboration with corporations is relatively less 
studied.  
We complement social movement theory with the theory of collaboration. According 
to Wood and Gray (1991) “collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of 
a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms and structures, 
to act or decide on issues related to that domain” (p. 146). The key elements of the concept of 
collaboration deserves explanation. In the collaboration process, multiple stakeholders agree 
on what the problem is, and that the problem is important enough to work with others to find 
a solution (Gray, 1996). Stakeholders retain their independent decision making powers in 
achieving shared values/rules within the collaborative alliance. However, participating 
stakeholders must explicitly agree on the shared values or rules or structures that will govern 
their interactive process (Wood and Gray, 1991; Gray, 1996).  In the final stage of the 
collaboration process, collaborators expect to see the implementation of the chosen course of 
action, requiring support and structure, including monitoring/auditing for compliance (Gray, 
1996).  NGOs and their collaborations with companies appear to influence the transparency 
and the openness of organizational actions.  Collaboration is considered to exist as long as the 
stakeholders engage in a process intended to result in action or decisions (Wood and Gray, 
1991).  Interestingly, in a range of social environments, collaboration and organisational 
engagement in collaboration may occur as a response to stakeholder pressure and extra-
institutional forces such as ‘protest’.  Through protest or boycott, activist social movement 
organisations have an important extra-institutional influence in creating corporate 
responsiveness (King and Soule, 2007). Protest as an extra-institutional tactic of activists 
appeals to third parties by broadcasting grievances publicly (King, 2008).  One of the 
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common outcomes suggested is collaboration as a vehicle for social change. However, it is 
interesting to know why a company responds to the expectations of its collaborators. One of 
the important motivations for a company to respond to collaborators is a desire to maintain 
and enhance legitimacy (i.e., companies’ collaboration with social movements have 
legitimating effects).  
It is our expectation that social movement forces (such as protest) influence 
companies to collaborate with NGOs and that this collaboration will have legitimating 
effects. Furthermore we expect that companies will respond to the participation of NGOs in 
their transparency process in order to maintain their legitimacy. Prior social movement 
literature suggests that social movement organizations not only collaborate with protest 
groups in order to strengthen their movement (Wang and Soule, 2012), but also collaborate 
with companies to increase the influence of the social movement on enhanced corporate 
transparency and legitimacy (Soule, 2012). Soule (2012) has provided an interesting example 
of Coca Cola that has been criticized for its use of water in developing nations, especially in 
India. In recent years, Coca Cola has sought advice from several NGOs, including the World 
Wildlife Fund, and has entered into partnerships and collaborations in an effort to respond to 
the criticisms and protests by changing its practices.  
Our expectation is also derived from the social movement literature that suggests that 
companies’ collaborations with NGOs can help them overcome these challenges.  
Collaborations can help companies and NGOs make sense of each other and channel 
institutional knowledge from the NGOs to the companies. Furthermore, the NGOs’ standing 
in civil society may confer social legitimacy to companies (Oetzel and Doh, 2009). 
Collaboration with NGOs is therefore important if companies seek to maintain legitimacy in 
complex and diverse institutional environments (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Similarly we 
argue that NGOs in a particular context (i.e., in the context of conflict minerals), is a vital 
actor whose collaboration with concerned companies provide a greater level of legitimacy in 
the global setting. The essence of existing collaboration theory and research presents some 
ideas, but no firm conclusions, as to whether legitimation is the motivation for companies to 
collaborate on corporate transparency with stakeholders. The fundamental issue is to enhance 
legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders who represent the broader community. And hence 
social movement organizations, such as NGOs, can become collaborating stakeholders that 
aim to bring change to society and represent broader community expectations.  
In summary, social movement theory suggests that NGOs can be agents of change in 
organizational fields, by offering new solutions to collective problems (King and Soule, 
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2007; Greenwood et al., 2002), creating change in the world of companies and business via 
the use of a tactical repertoire designed to complement their status as outsiders to those 
companies (Soule et al., 1999), or presenting themselves as alternative democratic voices 
(King and Soule, 2007).  The concept of collaboration therefore suggests that companies or 
organizations engage in collaboration with NGOs to solve their problems, create change, 
enhance transparency and maintain legitimacy.   
In the context of global supply chains, there are several human rights problems (child 
labour, human trafficking, slave and forced labour, etc.) to be resolved (through 
collaboration) in general. Historically NGOs have a significant role in creating change within 
the global supply chains. For example, within the clothing industry, NGO social movements 
in the USA led by the Asian American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) have shaken the whole 
industry and global actors through their anti-child labour campaigns and protests.  Within the 
supply chain of the electronic reliant industries, NGOs have a role to create an environment 
to influence the comprehensiveness (and thereby the transparency) of disclosures in relation 
to conflict minerals. Based on the above discussion of social movement theory and the 
concept of collaboration, we propose the following hypothesis:   
H1: Collaboration with NGOs will result in more comprehensive corporate conflict 
mineral disclosures.  
There are different categories of NGO-corporation collaboration to pursue different 
social and environmental goals (Austin, 2000; Arenas et al., 2009; Rondinelli and London, 
2003; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012; Mandell, 1999).  Based on the degree of interaction and level 
of engagement, there can be different levels or types of collaboration, i.e., arm’s length 
relationships, interactive collaborations, intensive alliances and transformational 
collaborations (Rondinelli and London, 2003; Kolk and Lenfant, 2012).  In the collaboration 
continuum, the level of engagement between collaborators moves from low to high and the 
level of interaction moves from infrequent to intensive (Austin, 2000).  We explore in our 
analysis whether more intensive collaboration result in more comprehensive disclosure. 
Based on our discussion of social movement theory and the role of social movement 
activism, our second hypothesis suggests that protest, as an extra-institutional activity by 
stakeholder groups such as social movement organisations, influence organisational decision 
making (e.g., Gamson, 1989; King et al., 2007; King and Soule, 2007).  Protest is an 
interesting part of stakeholder pressure that has not been considered in prior accounting 
research (but see stakeholder pressures in Roberts, 1992; Islam and Deegan, 2008). King and 
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Soule, (2007) argues that protest is a viable tactic to influence corporate behaviour. Activist 
(NGO) protests via picketing, demonstrations, boycotts, campaigns, etc., is a natural social 
movement tactic used to call for the involvement of various audiences in the change process, 
and hence this can be considered as the ‘dominant mode of governance’ to discipline 
corporations (King and Soule, 2007, p.415).  In line with these arguments (i.e., particularly 
with reference to King and Soule, 2007; King, 2008) we regard ‘protest’ as a particular form 
of social movement activism and propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The comprehensiveness of disclosures on conflict minerals is enhanced by activist 
protest against corporate activities regarding conflict minerals. 
Carberry et al. (2017) suggest that both activist protest and NGO collaboration impact 
organisational practices. While activist protests are more effective at influencing indirectly by 
transforming organizational fields (i.e., protest mostly create change at the field level), NGO 
collaborations directly influence corporate managers (i.e., NGO collaboration create change 
at the firm level).  Given our hypotheses that both collaboration and protest have a positive 
impact on corporate disclosure, we are interested in how these factors interact. While activist 
protest as an extra-institutional force indirectly influence corporate practices (King and Soule, 
2007; King, 2008), it may in particular influence corporations to collaborate with NGOs 
which in turn influence corporate disclosure practices. While activist protest appeals to third 
parties or news media by broadcasting grievances publicly (King, 2008), as a response to 
such protests, NGO collaboration could be more effective to create change in corporate 
accountability and disclosure practices. We therefore consider whether collaboration and 
protest action interact and influence the comprehensiveness of disclosure in this way, i.e., 
NGO collaboration may have more influence on the comprehensiveness of disclosure for 
companies that experienced protest action.  We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Collaboration with social movement NGOs has a bigger impact on the 
comprehensiveness of corporate conflict mineral disclosures, if activist protest against 
corporate activities regarding conflict minerals is present  
 
6. Research methods 
This study focuses on companies forming part of the 2014 Forbes Global 2000 companies 
that are involved in electronics reliant industries.8 Griffin et al. (2014) indicate that conflict 
                                                          
8 The Forbes Global 2000 consists of the world’s biggest public companies. Forbes compile their Global 2000 
list using four metrics: sales, profits, assets and market value. Each of the Global 2000 metrics has a minimum 
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minerals are essential for a wide range of consumer products including auto parts, cell 
phones, jet aircraft, products with integrated circuits and capacitors (almost all consumer 
electronics), medical equipment, and products using solder for metal joints. We identified 
475 companies as electronic reliant companies and out of them 139 companies were listed on 
US stock exchanges and submitted conflict mineral reports to the SEC in 2014.9 Of these, 95 
companies (68%) are based in the USA and the rest of the companies are based in European 
and developing countries (including China).  Reporting on conflict minerals were reviewed to 
ascertain the comprehensiveness of the disclosures. The conflict mineral reports were 
collected from the SEC website.10 
6.1 Conflict mineral disclosures  
We developed a disclosure index to document the comprehensiveness of the disclosures. In 
developing the different elements of disclosure for our index, we considered the disclosure 
requirements within the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD’s due diligence guidance addressing 
conflict minerals (basic guidance was discussed in section 3 above). We used prior CSR 
disclosure research to determine the nature of the disclosure items in our disclosure list (i.e., 
our index). However, the disclosure items in our index are new in nature in so far as there is 
no known research that looked at these items with regards to evaluating the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosure on conflict minerals. Nine specific disclosure items are 
considered in our index and a scale was applied to assess the comprehensiveness of the 
disclosure for each item (See Table 1).   
We assess the level of comprehensiveness of disclosures, following recent studies in 
the literature.11 For example, Beattie (2014) considered the level of comprehensiveness of 
disclosure as a proxy for quality of disclosure, while Van Staden and Hooks (2007) 
quantified the comprehensiveness of disclosure using an index of items and a quality scale. 
Beattie (2014, p. 113) stated that key characteristics of the quality disclosure index approach 
                                                          
cut-off value in order for a company to qualify: sales $4.16 billion, profits of $267.0 million, assets of $8.57 
billion and market value of $5.49 billion. A company needs to qualify for at least one of the metrics in order to 
be eligible for the final Global 2000 ranking. 
9 There was some missing data for the control variable CSR Performance (see Table 4), leading to a sample of 
133 companies for which all the data was available. 
10 See website at: https://searchwww.sec.gov/EDGARFSClient/jsp/EDGAR_MainAccess.jsp? 
search_text=*&sort=Date&formType=FormSD&isAdv=true&stemming=true&numResults=10 
11 In a supplementary test we use the extent of disclosure as a proxy for comprehensiveness in recognition of the 
earlier (CSR) disclosure research that focused on extent measures (i.e., words and sentences). However, we find 
that comprehensiveness is a better measure for our purpose. 
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may ‘include (i) whether each item is measured in simple binary (i.e. presence/absence) terms 
[see for example, Islam and McPhail, 2011] or an ordinal measure is used to try to capture 
quality aspects [see Cannizzaro and Weiner (2015) as example]; and (ii) whether each item is 
weighted or unweighted [see for example, Van Staden and Hooks, 2007]’.  Cannizzaro and 
Weiner (2015) evaluated disclosure comprehensiveness by categorising disclosure items into 
three categories: full disclosures, partial disclosures and minimal disclosure, while Van 
Staden and Hooks (2007) used a five point scale which gives a higher weighting to more 
comprehensive disclosures. We take a similar approach and used a scale of 0/1/2 (where 0 
means no disclosure, 1 means minimal disclosure and 2 means high level comprehensive 
disclosure – the scale is applied to each item in Table 1). Our approach is similar to prior 
research assessing the comprehensiveness (quality) of voluntary CSR disclosures (see for 
example, Clarkson et al., 2008, Van Staden and Hooks, 2007, Cho et al., 2015). Beattie’s 
(2014) review confirm that recent studies have used scale based disclosure indices.  
The details of the coding guide, including the index items and the scale, are provided 
in Table 1. An expert content analyst reviewed the reports and completed the coding.  
Another member of the project verified the expert’s coding process by reviewing the first 
twenty coded conflict mineral reports.  
<< Insert Table 1>> 
We base our content analysis on the first reports filed with the SEC as at 31 May 2014 
(covering products manufactured from 1 January 2013). The maximum possible disclosure 
score a company may have is 18. However, as shown in Table 2, the highest score obtained 
was 12. Only four companies have scored 12. The majority of the companies have scored 
between 4 and 9 (mean 5.727). The last column of Table 2 shows the average disclosure 
score for each of the nine specific issues, being the mean score of each item divided by the 
maximum possible score for that item (see also Table 1). Management commitment and Due 
diligence issues received the highest scores.  
<< Insert Table 2 >> 
6.2 Collaboration with social movement NGOs (NGOCollab) 
Arenas et al. (2009) argue that ‘new’ forms of collaboration between NGOs and corporations 
promote social and environmental actions, design corporate social responsibility standards 
and reporting processes, participate in monitoring activities and provide technical assistance 
to corporations. These forms of collaboration are intensive and engaged. In this type of 
collaboration both parties aim to create corporate social transparency and legitimacy and 
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maintain their reputation and public image (Rondinelli and London, 2003). In this paper, we 
examine the impact of engaged and intensive collaborations between social movement NGOs 
and corporations on the transparency of disclosures relating to conflict minerals.12 
Following the Dodd-Frank act, social movement organizations are seen to collaborate 
with companies to monitor and provide skills and resources to assist companies to identify 
and eliminate conflict mineral sources, and report on the process. We define the nature of this 
level of collaboration as specific, intensive and engaged (Rondinelli and London, 2003; 
Mandell, 1999; Austin, 2000).  Such collaboration appears to influence conflict mineral 
disclosures because one of the key aims of the collaboration is to create social transparency 
and provide solutions for transparency related problems within supply chains.  The main 
purpose of collaboration with social movement NGOs is involvement in monitoring activities 
(including assisting with internal control issues) and relatively permanent organised efforts to 
identify and eliminate conflict minerals and ensure transparency within supply chains. We 
identified four major NGO collaborators of our sample firms and provide more details of 
these collaborators in Appendix 1.13   
The collaborations across the four NGOs range from less intensive and engaged to 
more engaged, intensive and task specific, as explained in the Appendix.  Among the four 
major NGO collaborators considered in this study, CFSI’s collaboration with electronic 
companies is more engaged, intensive and task specific than any of the others. CFSI and 
companies come ‘together out of a joint concern about addressing a particular social 
problem’ (Austin, 2000, p. 77), this being the elimination of human rights issues within 
conflict mineral zones.  
The data on collaboration with NGOs have been collected from the company annual 
reports, websites and conflict mineral reports. We complemented this data by going to the 
websites of the four main collaborating NGOs in this area and using the lists of collaborating 
companies from these websites to verify and extend our list of collaborating companies. We 
identified whether each company in our sample collaborated with social movement NGOs on 
                                                          
12 Some examples of intensive and engaged collaboration from Rondinelli and London (2003, p. 65) include: 
NGOs seeking to prevent pollution and environmental damage before it occurs by working more directly with 
companies to change their products or processes, and companies working with the Alliance for Environmental 
Innovations to improve internal operations, for example, reduced energy, resource use and pollution. 
13 Detail membership (corporate collaborators) of movement  organizations can be viewed at EICC- Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition  <http://www.eiccoalition.org/>; CFSI - Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative 
<http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/about/>; GeSI - Global e-Sustainability Initiative  <http://gesi.org/>; and 
AIAG - Automotive Industry Action Group <http://www.aiag.org/about> (last viewed on 12/06/2016). 
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conflict minerals during the year before 31 May 2014.  In these sources, companies recognise 
who they collaborate with in terms of transparency initiatives. For example, Sony mentioned 
on its website:  
“It is also Sony's policy to require its suppliers to source materials from smelters determined 
to be compliant with the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)/Global e-
Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS) Program protocols, or other 
smelters that have been determined to be conflict-free smelters or determined to be conflict-
free under other trusted traceability projects. The smelters identified by our direct suppliers 
were then compared against the conflict-free smelter list prepared by the Conflict-Free 
Smelter Initiative (CFSI) established by the EICC/GeSI, to further enhance the accuracy of 
Sony's findings” (see, http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_report/sourcing/materials/). 
Further examples of disclosures of collaborations within the conflict mineral reports include: 
“EMC is an active participant in the CFSI, engaging in workgroups and projects to advance 
both the CMRT and the CFSP. This collaboration helps us advance toward our goal, and it 
also helps to build a global supply chain system for responsible and ethical mineral sourcing 
that makes it more widely possible for companies to source DRC Conflict-Free minerals for 
their products” (EMC Conflict Mineral Report for the year ended Dec 31, 2013, p. 1).  
“In January 2012, JEITA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative 
(GeSI) and agreed to collaborate in addressing conflict minerals issues. EICC and GeSI set 
up the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) as a structure to address these issues and 
created the Conflict Free Smelter (CFS) program. This program starts with the audit of 
smelters and refiners and is expected to be used as a means to validate trading from there 
through the downstream supply chain by inspecting whether conflict minerals that fund 
armed groups have entered the supply chain. JEITA participates and cooperates with the 
CFSI and Kyocera cooperates with the CFSI as a principal member of JEITA while also 
making use of the CFS program” (Kyocera Group Conflict Mineral Report for the calendar 
year ended Dec 31, 2013, p.3).  
 
In terms of collaboration by the companies in our sample, we find that 65 of the 139 
companies (47%) had a collaboration with an NGO while 74 (53%) had no collaboration. 
Furthermore, 37 companies had more than one collaboration (and two had more than two), 
i.e., 57% of those who collaborated had more than one collaboration. Having a sample with 
almost the same number of companies collaborating and not collaborating with NGOs, gives 
us the opportunity to investigate the effect of collaboration on the disclosure quality while 
also controlling for other factors influencing disclosure quality. The extent of collaboration 
(i.e. the number of collaborations) is our preferred measure of the intensity of collaboration as 
it is an interval scale rather than a dichotomous indicator; does not discard information and 
hence reflects information on more intense collaborations rather than just collaborating or 
not, and so provides a more nuanced view of the relationship with disclosure.14 We therefore 
use the extent of collaboration as our collaboration measure (NGOCollab). 
                                                          
14 In addition, we could not run a test with the dummy variable ‘existence of collaboration’ - according to 




6.3 Activist protest (Protest)  
Protests vary in the nature of information they communicate: a boycott may have its own 
disruptive effects on the corporation, other protests such as demonstrations may draw 
attention to media and existing stakeholder concerns and may cause stakeholders to question 
firms’ irresponsible behaviour (King and Soule, 2007). Larger or more frequent protests have 
a greater impact because of the disruption to the organisation’s routine activities (Luders, 
2006; King and Soule, 2007). While media attention itself has an effect on corporate practices 
including disclosure practices (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Islam and Deegan, 2010), protests 
highlighted in the media has even greater influence on corporate accountability practices. 
Activists and NGOs use the media to highlight their boycotts and protests to encourage 
corporate social accountability (Deegan and Islam, 2014). Protests and negative media 
attention regarding social and human rights issues appear to have bigger impacts on corporate 
behaviour than protests to protect the environment (King and Soule, 2007; Islam and Deegan, 
2010; Deegan and Islam, 2014).  Data on protest events were collected from media articles 
from the Dow Jones Factiva database and media articles and NGO reports available in the 
online resources in the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC),15 a London 
based global NGO.  We used search keywords including ‘protest’, ‘boycott’, ‘demonstration’, 
‘campaign’, ‘NGO’, ‘activist’, ‘human rights’, ‘conflict minerals’, and ‘supply chains’ to 
identify relevant media articles and NGO reports on each company within our sample. After 
we identified relevant articles and reports, we then read through each of the media articles 
and NGO reports to identify the number of ‘protest events’ for the companies in our sample.  
Our data collection approach is consistent with Islam and Deegan (2010) and King and Soule 
(2007). 
 
6.4 Control variables 
Prior research on CSR disclosures has shown that there are many factors that could influence 
the extent and comprehensiveness of CSR disclosures. Seeing that conflict mineral 
disclosures could be classified as CSR disclosures, we use similar control variables in our 
                                                          
dummy variable. We can also not use OLS tests as OLS can produce biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates in the presence of an endogenous variable. We found that the collaboration variable is endogenous 
using a Hausman test, see below. 
15 BHRRC tracks the human rights performance of over 6000 companies in over 180 countries, making 
information provided by the media and NGOs publicly available. 
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model. We therefore control for the effects of CSR performance, size, industry, profitability, 
other financial and market measures (i.e., leverage, volatility and Tobin’s Q) and country 
measures. Table 3 shows a summary of all our variables, including the source and calculation 
of the variables.  
CSR performance (CSRPerf). We know from the CSR literature that there is a relationship 
between CSR disclosure and CSR performance (see for example, Patten, 2002; Al-Tuwaijri et 
al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Silva-Gao, 2012). We argue that corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance could influence conflict mineral disclosure. Since 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance demonstrate a commitment to CSR 
and therefore to the elimination of socially unacceptable practices like the use of conflict 
minerals, we use the ESG performance measure from the Bloomberg database as a 
performance measure in our study. The Bloomberg ESG score ranges from 0 to 100 and is 
determined based on a whole range of indicators in each of the three areas. In the 
environmental area (E), this is based on 119 items which include items on verification, 
emissions intensity, resource consumption and supply chain management. In the social area 
(S), this is based on 45 items which include items on accidents and fatalities, operational 
policy and supply chain issues. In the governance area (G), this is based on 96 items which 
include items on board structure and independence, board committees and shareholder rights. 
These measures are designed to capture actual performance in each of the areas, rather than 
just policies and intentions.16 In sensitivity tests we also use other social performance 
measures. 
Company size (SIZE). Large companies have a greater societal impact (Hackston and Milne, 
1996; Patten, 2002). Since they are more visible, they face more stakeholder pressure to 
demonstrate their social responsibility (Aerts and Cormier, 2009). In line with other studies in 
the literature (De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011; Clarkson et al., 2008), we use the natural 
logarithm of total assets as SIZE. Since our sample is drawn from the biggest companies in 
the world, size may not be an influence for this group of companies. However, we 
nevertheless include the size measure as it is so widely used in disclosure studies.  
Industry. We divided the sample into five industries based on the Global Industries 
Classification Standard (GICS) sector name. We have the following industries in the sample: 
                                                          
16 Bloomberg ESG data captures standardized cross-sector and industry-specific metrics. Although Bloomberg, 
like KLD, uses corporate reports as an input to their ratings, they augment this with other formal and informal 




Information Technology and Telecommunications (N = 67); Industrials (N = 23); Energy (N 
= 17); Healthcare (N = 16); and Consumer Discretionary (N = 16). We include a dummy 
variable for each of these industries in our model. 
Financial performance and position (ROA, LEV, TOBIN Q, and VOLAT). Profitability is 
seen as a determinant for CSR news exposure (see for example, Aerts and Cormier, 2009; 
Alrazi et al., 2016). Profitable firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose social and 
environmental information to manage their image as socially responsive. We measure 
profitability by return on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items to total assets (Clarkson et al., 2008, De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011). 
Since social and environmental issues can affect the financial stability of an 
organization, Roberts (1992) asserts that highly leveraged firms will face greater expectations 
from creditors to observe their social responsibility activities, including initiatives to deal 
with conflict minerals. Therefore, they would be expected to provide more extensive 
disclosures. LEV, our measure of leverage, is calculated as average total assets divided by 
average total common equity, i.e., financial leverage.  
Tobin’s Q (TOBIN Q) could represent the level of intangible assets in a firm as well 
as the long-term value of the firm (Cahan et al., 2016). While companies with a higher 
composition of intangible assets in relation to physical assets could be less polluting (see for 
example, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011) 
these companies could still face social issues like the use of conflict minerals. While some 
studies suggest that companies with a lower Tobin’s Q would be disclosing more 
environmental information than firms with a higher Tobin’s Q (see for example, Clarkson et 
al., 2008; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2011) it is not clear what the relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and social disclosures would be. We nevertheless include it following its inclusion 
in environmental studies in the literature. TOBIN Q is measured as the market value of the 
shares plus the value of preference shares, long term debt and current liabilities, divided by 
total assets.  
We also assess the financial position of each company based on its share price 
volatility (VOLAT). Erratic share price movements could indicate financial instability and 
engaging in socially and environmental irresponsible behaviour would further add to the 
riskiness as an investment. In this sense, there would be a greater pressure for ‘volatile’ 
companies to demonstrate social and environmental responsibility. VOLAT is measured as the 
standard deviation of market adjusted daily share returns during the year. 
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Country. Since only companies listed on a US exchange will file a conflict mineral report 
with the SEC, all companies in the sample are listed in the US. However, not all the 
companies are US companies.  We distinguish between the US (95), Europe (25), Japan (6) 
and the rest of the world (13) (i.e., countries with less than 5 companies). We include a 
dummy variable for each of these countries in our model. 
 
     << Insert Table 3 >> 
 
We use the Hausman test to test for endogeneity. We find that NGO collaboration 
(NGOCollab) is endogenous (p = 0.020) while protest events (Protest) is not (p = 0.991).17 
Since we find endogeneity in our main variable of interest, we use three stage least square 
analysis (3SLS) for our main analysis. We use the following model to test our hypothesis:   
Disclosure = a1 + B1NGOCollab + B2Protest + B3NGOCollabXProtest + B4CSRPerf + B5SIZE + 
B6ROA + B7LEV + B8TOBIN Q + B9VOLAT + ∑ 𝐵13
10





7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables.  
<< Insert Table 4 >> 
 
The mean disclosure score is 31.82% with a minimum score of 5.55% and a 
maximum score of 66.67%.18 The mean collaboration with social movement NGOs 
(NGOCollab) is 0.75 (min 0, max 3).  For the protest measure (Protest) the mean number of 
protest events is 1.31 (min 0, max 24).  
The mean for performance in the CSR area (CSRPerf) is 35.99 (min 5.37, max 
83.06). The average assets for companies in the sample (SIZE) is $50,5 billion (min $1,7 
billion, max $656,5 billion). Average return on investment (ROA) is 8.08%, average leverage 
(LEV) is 3.06 and average Tobin’ Q (TOBIN Q) 1.89 with an average volatility (VOLAT) of 
25.54. 
 
                                                          
17 The STATA statistical analysis function treat all exogenous variables as instrumental variables in the 3SLS 
analysis. The following variables are therefore instrumental variables: Protest, CSRPerf, SIZE, ROA, LEV, 
TOBIN Q, VOLAT, Industrials, Energy, Healthcare, Cons Discr, Europe, Japan, Rest. 
18 In our analyses we use a disclosure score out of 100, based on the actual score obtained for the nine items 




Table 5 provides correlation measures. A review of the correlation statistics indicates that, as 
expected, at the bivariate level, collaboration (NGOCollab) and activist protest (Protest) are 
significantly (and positively) associated (at the 1% level) with more comprehensive 
disclosure scores. The interaction between collaboration and protest (CollabXProt) is also 
significantly associated (at the 1% level) with more comprehensive disclosures.  Table 5 also 
indicates that some of the control variables are significantly associated with disclosure, which 
is a good reason for doing multivariate analysis.  The correlations are not high enough to 
suggest a problem with collinearity – the highest correlation being 0.695 between ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. 
 
<< Insert Table 5 >> 
 
To focus further on the intensity of collaboration, we distinguish between companies that 
collaborated with the CFSI and those that collaborated with other NGOs. We argued before 
that collaboration with the CFSI is more engaged, intensive and task specific.  We note that 
47 companies collaborated with the CFSI while 39 companies collaborated with EICC, 12 
with GeSI and 6 with AIAA.19  From Table 6 it is clear that those who collaborated had a 
significantly higher mean disclosures score (36.15) than those who did not. If we split the 
sample further between CFSI and other collaborations, we find that those who collaborated 
with CFSI had a significantly (at the 5% level) higher mean disclosure score (37.77) than 
those with other collaborations (31.94). While both of these are significantly higher than the 
disclosure score of those that did not collaborate (22.03), it is clear that collaboration with 
CFSI lead to more comprehensive disclosures compared to other collaborations.  More 
intense, engaged and task specific collaboration therefore improves the comprehensiveness of 
the conflict mineral disclosures. 
 
7.3 Means analysis 
We did a number of means tests which gave some interesting results – see Table 6. Firstly we 
compared companies that had NGO collaboration with those that did not and find that the 
mean disclosure score of those that collaborated is significantly higher (p = 0.000) than those 
                                                          
19 The 65 companies that collaborated had 104 collaborations between them as 57% of those who collaborated 
had more than one collaboration. 
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who did not collaborate. The mean number of protest events is also significantly different (p 
= 0.006) between those that collaborated and those who did not, suggesting that protest leads 
to collaboration. Furthermore, there is no significance difference in the mean CSR 
performance measure between those that collaborated and those who did not.  
Next we split the sample on the basis of those who had above average disclosure 
scores versus the rest. For those with above average disclosure scores we find that the mean 
collaboration level is significantly higher (p = 0.001) and the mean number of protest events 
are also significantly higher (p = 0.001). There is no significant difference in the mean CSR 
performance between these two groups.  
Finally we split the sample between US and non-US companies. Surprisingly we find 
that US companies have on average significantly lower average CSR performance (p = 0.001) 
than non-US companies. However, there is no difference between the disclosure scores, 
protest events and collaboration levels of US and non-US companies. Our results are 
therefore not driven by US companies. 
<< Insert Table 6 >> 
The means tests therefore provide bivariate evidence that protest is strongly 
associated with collaboration which, we suggest, then influences the comprehensiveness of 
disclosures.  Therefore those who experienced protest both collaborated and had better 
disclosure scores, we would argue because of the collaboration. More comprehensive 
disclosure is therefore the result of collaboration, but not of CSR performance or being a US 
company. Also US companies do not collaborate more or less, or experience more protest 
action than the other companies in the sample. In the next analysis we will be considering 
these factors together in a multivariate regression analysis. 
 
7.4 Regression analysis 
The results of the three stage least squares analysis are reported in Table 7.  NGO 
Collaboration (NGOCollab) is highly significant and positive and so is protest events 
(Protest). The interaction between collaboration and protest (NGOCollabXProtest) is also 
significant, but the effect (coefficient) is negligible.  
For the control variables we see that profitability is significant and positive at the 5% 
level while companies with less leverage also have more comprehensive disclosures, at the 
10% level of significance. None of the other financial control variables are significant. 
Companies in the Healthcare industry have more comprehensive disclosures at the 10% level 
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(than the control industry, Information Technology and Telecommunications). In terms of the 
country variables, companies from the rest of the world have less comprehensive conflict 
mineral disclosures at the 5% level (than the control country, the USA).  
  << Insert Table 7 >> 
 
7.5 Discussion of results 
Given the indications from the bivariate correlations (Table 5) and the test of means (Table 6) 
and the strong results from the multivariate 3SLS regression (Table 7) (which controls for 
other factors that could influence the quality of disclosure, including protest events and CSR 
performance) our analysis suggest that collaboration with NGOs has a positive and highly 
significant influence on the comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosures. While we 
cannot of course claim to have demonstrated causality, we have controlled for potential 
endogeneity of variables of interest and the model results show strong associations and thus 
are consistent with our hypothesis of causality.  Hypothesis 1 is therefore strongly supported. 
 We find that NGO protest events also have a significant influence (at the 5% level) on 
disclosures. We note this from the correlations (Table 5) the means test (Table 6) and the 
3SLS analysis (Table 7). This provides support for Hypothesis 2. 
 Seeing that both collaboration and protest are significantly related to disclosure, we 
analyse this relationship further. From Tables 5 and 6 we can see that protest is significantly 
related to collaboration, so could protest influence disclosure through collaboration? From 
our correlation test (Table 5) we note that the interaction between NGO collaboration and 
protest action (NGOCollabXProtest) has a very significant positive effect on disclosure (R = 
0.564/0.425 at the 1% level) while our 3SLS analysis (Table 7) show that the interaction is 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that as collaboration and protest increase, disclosure 
increases. However, while significant, the effect is negligible.20 There is therefore some 
support for Hypothesis 3.21  
 What makes the biggest difference? Analysing the marginal effects of these three 
variables shows that the marginal effects are more strongly driven by NGOCollab (coefficient 
                                                          
20 The interaction variable is of statistical significance and important to include in order to avoid the omitted 
variable problem, but the practical effect of the interaction is not really important. 
21 Furthermore, if we compare the coefficient for collaboration (NGOCollab) before we add the protest variable 
(4.559 - untabulated) with the coefficient including protest (19.433 – Table 7) it suggests that collaboration has a 
bigger impact on the comprehensiveness of disclosure when protest is present (i.e., an increase in collaboration 
will increase the comprehensiveness by 19.43% when protest is present vs. 4.56% if it is not present). However, 
we acknowledge running the 3SLS without the protest variables could result in biased results due to omitted 
variable bias in the model without protest. 
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19.433; p-value 0.000) than Protest (coefficient 9.244; p-value 0.015) and the interaction of 
collaboration and protest, although statistically significant, cause a very small attenuation of 
the effect (coefficient 0.769; p-value 0.017). One unit change in NGOCollab therefore has a 
much bigger increase in disclosure quality than a unit change in Protest and in both cases the 
influence of the interaction (NGOCollabXProtest) has no material influence on the marginal 
effects. 
 
7.6 Further analysis for robustness 
Using a different disclosure measure 
While we use the comprehensiveness of disclosure as the disclosure measure in our main 
analysis, we are aware that some research in the CSR area use extent measures for disclosure 
(i.e., word, sentences, pages). We have motivated comprehensiveness as the best option from 
the current CSR/content analysis research. However, the decisions involved in allocating a 
score to a disclosure is arguably more subjective than to just count the number of words, 
sentences, and/or pages in a conflict mineral report. Therefore, as a sensitivity test we 
collected extent measures and replace the disclosure score in our main analysis with an extent 
measure. 
 We note firstly from a correlation analysis that the extent measures are highly 
correlated to each other, as would be expected. Words lead to sentences (R = 0.860) and to 
pages (R = 0.898). Furthermore, our disclosure score is related to extent (i.e., with sentences 
R = 0.74). This can be explained in that to do comprehensive reporting in the conflict mineral 
report will require more sentences. Companies will not be able to comprehensively report on 
the items in our index using only a few sentences. This was also found by Hooks and Van 
Staden (2011, p.11) “….if companies wanted to address all the areas covered by [a] quality 
assessment index, a large number of sentences were required. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the correlation between extent and quality was high.” 
 When we replace our disclosure score with an extent measure (sentences), we observe 
that our results remain qualitatively the same.22  
 
                                                          
22 In this and the other additional tests, ‘qualitatively the same’ means that the results, while not having exactly 
the same numeric values, have the same qualities, i.e., collaboration, protest and the interaction term have the 
same (level of) statistical significance and show the same coefficient differentials as in the main analysis. The 
marginal effects therefore continue to be more strongly driven by NGOCollab than Protest; and the interaction 
of collaboration and protest has a negligible effect. 
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Using different measures for CSR performance 
In our main analysis we use the ESG measure from the Bloomberg database as our CSR 
performance measure. In our sensitivity analysis we use a lead (ESG2014) and lag 
(ESG2012) measure. Again the results remain qualitatively the same.  
 Next we construct another CSR performance measure from the Bloomberg data. We 
use a combination of four measures: Social Supply Chain Management (SSCM); 
Sustainability Supply Guidelines (SSG); Anti-bribery Ethics Policy (AEP); and Business 
Ethics Policy (BEP). Since all four these items were measured as 1 or 0 by Bloomberg, we 
calculate an average over the four measures as our Combined Ethics Score (CES). Replacing 
the ESG variable with our CES variable results in qualitatively similar results. 
We also replaced the ESG variables with the components E (Environmental score), S 
(Social score) and G (Governance score) respectively and again find qualitatively similar 
results to the main analysis.  
 The different CSR performance measures that we used in robustness tests, show that 
our model is robust to different measures of CSR performance. 
 
Using different size measures 
Since different size measures are highly correlated with each other, we could not use more 
than one of these in the same model. In our main model we use the natural log of total assets 
as the size measure. We also ran the model using sales and market value as size measures. 
Again, following the literature in the area, we use the natural log of these measures as they 
are not normally distributed. The results remain qualitatively the same as the main results.  
The size measures are not significant. This shows that our model is robust to different 
measures of size.   
It is interesting that size does not affect the disclosure results as it is often implicated 
in the literature as a driver for (voluntary) disclosure. We note from the correlation table 
(Table 5) that size is significantly correlated (at the 1% level) with Protest (i.e., bigger 
companies attract more protest), but not with collaboration and disclosure.23 A few 
explanations comes to mind. Firstly our sample is from the biggest companies in the world 
(the Forbes Global 2000 companies, see footnote 7), so size may not have an effect if the 
sample consist of very large companies. Second, conflict mineral disclosure is required for 
                                                          
23 Bigger companies also have better CSR performance but lower profitability, Tobin’s Q and volatility. 
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US listed companies, so the size effect on the disclosure decision is obviously not relevant, 
and it seems like the size effect on disclosure comprehensiveness (quality) is not significant 
in these circumstances. 
 
Using a different country measure  
Instead of the three country measures we use in the main analysis, we also run the regression 
using a country variable indicating if the companies are from the US or not. Our results 
remain qualitatively the same.  The country variable is not significant suggesting that US 
companies do not make more comprehensive conflict mineral disclosures compared to other 
countries. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusions  
The elimination of conflict minerals from the supply chains of US companies is a major 
social justice issue.  Disclosure of the existence of conflict minerals in the supply chain 
would be an important step in the elimination process. Supply chain disclosures in 
accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act, is therefore an important issue.  Following social 
movement theory and the theory of collaboration, we are interested to determine if the 
comprehensiveness of disclosures on conflict minerals is influenced by social movement 
activities to create corporate transparency regarding conflict mineral use. While the Act 
requires a minimum level of disclosure, the literature suggests that the comprehensiveness of 
both voluntary and mandatory disclosures is subject to a range of internal and external 
influences. Using a disclosure index derived from the requirements of the Dodd-Frank act 
and the OECD guidelines for conflict mineral supply chains, we investigate the roles of NGO 
collaboration and activist protest with respect to the comprehensiveness of conflict mineral 
disclosures by 139 of the largest global electronic reliant companies. We find that 
collaboration with NGOs, as social movement organizations, and activist protest lead to more 
comprehensive and therefore more transparent disclosures.  Our findings suggest that NGO 
collaboration with corporations has a higher impact on corporate conflict mineral disclosures 
if activist protest against corporate activities regarding conflict minerals is present.  Similarly, 
the marginal effects on disclosure are more strongly driven by NGO collaboration than 
activist protest, indicating that one unit of change in the intensity of NGO collaboration has a 
much bigger increase in disclosure comprehensiveness than a unit change in protest action. 
Our findings in particular suggest that engaged collaboration with social movement NGOs 
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improve corporate transparency, even for a mandated disclosure, i.e., conflict minerals in 
corporate supply chains.  
We use a combination of social movement theory and the theory of collaboration to 
understand the disclosure practices. Social movement theory is a widely used theory in 
sociology and organizational studies. Although organizational sociologists have become more 
interested recently in social movement theory as a way of thinking about causes of 
organizational change (King and Soule, 2007), research has not sufficiently addressed how 
NGOs as organizational outsiders effect the transparency of disclosure practices. Like many 
other stakeholders (for example the news media), NGOs lack access to the conventional 
avenues of corporate decision making, but they have gained influence in the realms of society 
through their protest actions and collaborations. The originality of this paper relates to an 
examination of an alternative mechanism (protest and collaboration) to influence companies’ 
transparency. While social movement theory explains the notion that NGOs can influence 
organizational practices, collaboration theory suggests that organizations respond and conform 
to the influences of social movement NGOs through collaboration, and that in turn results in 
more comprehensive and transparent disclosures.  
This study addresses an important research problem by investigating the role of NGOs 
in corporate disclosure practices. Prior research, considered the roles of different stakeholders 
(see for example, Deegan, 2002; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2015), but does not systematically 
explain whether and how a company conforms to the expectations of the broader community 
which are manifested by NGO actions, i.e., their collaboration with companies and/or their 
independent (protest) actions.  A discussion of disclosure practices, as a part of the response to 
NGO influence, is missing in the accounting research.  The findings of this paper make it clear 
that collaboration with NGOs as outsiders can have a real influence in the corporate 
transparency sphere. Their role as outsiders gives them a unique opportunity. NGOs, through 
their protests/campaigns and collaborations, act as extra-institutional actors, with the goal of 
changing corporate practices. Within the accounting literature, we see how extra-institutional 
actors such as the media influence corporate disclosures. Research in understanding the role of 
NGOs is therefore important. In particular if researchers wish to investigate corporate reporting 
on human rights, the role of social movement NGOs’ should not be ignored. 
Our findings have implications for those who study corporate accountability practices 
within supply chains. There is little research focusing on accountability issues within supply 
chain management. As NGOs play an active role in the construction of changing corporate 
responsibilities (O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2015), there is a possibility that companies translate 
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such stakeholder concerns into their core accountability and disclosure practices. One of the 
main implications of our findings is that companies may gain tactical value by paying attention 
to societal actors/stakeholders who may not have direct investment in the companies. That is, 
if companies do not collaborate with these NGOs to change their transparency and 
accountability, they may run the risk of giving them reasons to express their grievances 
publicly, at which point the companies may lose control of the issue to the public and thereby 
loose legitimacy.  We show the link between social movement action through NGOs and the 
comprehensiveness of corporate supply chain disclosures, but the implications could be 
broader in terms of companies’ image, reputation and legitimacy.  
Given the disclosure regulations in place (the Dodd-Frank Act), it is obvious that 
companies would disclose information in order to comply with the regulations. But the 
implications of this paper is that while the regulations influence disclosure (minimum 
disclosure), the variations of extent and comprehensiveness of disclosure that we have observed 
in this study cannot simply be explained by regulation. We find that it is the actions of social 
movements that lead to the variations of disclosures. The role of social movements, including 
public support, therefore creates a new environment where regulators and companies respond. 
The SEC rules will eventually affect at least six thousand issuers, which is about half of all 
publicly traded companies in the United States.  We are of the opinion that our results could 
also apply to any country that implement similar legislation, e.g., the UK Modern Slavery Act 
2015 and the EU Conflict Minerals regulation of 2017.  Our study has implications because the 
conflict minerals rules (section 1502) and the influence of social movements revisit the 
question of “materiality to market players such as shareholders” in that social movements 
influence the level of disclosures regardless of materiality in the eyes of shareholders. The rise 
of the social movement NGOs has shifted the paradigm away from accounting and financial 
information only, demanding more transparency on issues of human rights and social 
responsibility. 
This study has some limitations. Although companies across different industries 
submitted conflict mineral reports to the SEC (KPMG, 2014), we looked at only companies 
within the electronic reliant industries. We found 139 large companies (within the Forbes 
global 2000 companies) from electronic reliant industries that submitted their conflict mineral 
reports to SEC as first time reporters. As we only look at companies within electronics reliant 
industries, the degree to which our findings can be generalized to other industries cannot be 
assessed.  Furthermore, our disclosure index could have a level of subjectivity, similar to many 
other studies in the literature using disclosure indices. As a sensitivity test, we also used the 
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extent of disclosure which is less subjective as it includes the full extent of the reports filed 
with the SEC.   
We acknowledge that the cross sectional nature of our sample has some limitation in 
that we cannot claim to have demonstrated causality. However, we have controlled for potential 
endogeneity of variables of interest and the model results show very strong associations and 
thus are consistent with our hypothesis of causality. In addition we controlled for all known 
influences on disclosure in our model. The benefit of our use of the first reports is that it 
removes the effects of institutional isomorphism and shows the influence of collaboration at a 
time when the reporting requirements were still unfamiliar. Also, it takes away the question of 
whether disclosure influences collaboration and protest, as these were the first conflict mineral 
reports filed with the SEC. Expanding the study to a longitudinal analysis could be a valuable 
extension of this research. Diff-in-diff analyses on pre- and post- effects of having conflict 
mineral reports will also be a useful extension of this research. 
When we evaluated the comprehensiveness of conflict mineral disclosures, we did not 
compare such disclosures with the actual actions conducted by collaborators as this information 
is not available in relation to conflict minerals. We are therefore not sure whether conflict 
mineral disclosures reflect real actions of the companies, or disclosures are fabricated (Preston 
et al., 1992), or disclosures are loosely coupled (decoupled) from real actions (Whiteman and 
Cooper, 2016) or even if the disclosures are simply greenwash (Delmas and Burbano, 2011).  
However, since the Section 1502 requires companies to disclose to the SEC and is subject to 
severe sanctions by the SEC for false or misleading filings, we anticipate less greenwash 
compared to voluntary disclosures in annual reports and on websites. 
The implications of our findings are that voices of social movements (through NGOs) 
and their efforts to create change in corporate accountability should not be underestimated by 
corporate managers, corporate policy makers and regulators. Our findings open the possibility 
for further research to investigate how voices available to secondary stakeholders (NGOs, 
social movement organisations, activists, media) matter to hold corporations accountable to 
protect human rights.  Our research also supports O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2016) call for more 
research on supply chain abuses.  For capital market researchers, our research provides stimuli 
for further research to address the question: if NGO collaboration results in more 
comprehensive disclosure, how will this in turn affect value relevance. For critical researchers, 
it may be worthwhile to investigate how NGO social justice movements operate and how 
contestation on such movements is manifested (Martinez, and Cooper, 2017) in an attempt to 
create corporate transparency and accountability. On a more theoretical level, this study calls 
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for further accounting and organizational research that will address the question of how extra-
institutional actors such as NGOs and other social movement organizations gain traction in 
society where there are a few legitimate platforms of influence. 
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Table 1: Conflict mineral disclosure index  
 Themes  Scale  CS Application of scale 
A Management commitment 
to reduce the use of conflict 
minerals in the supply chain 
0-2 2 No disclosure of commitment or plan, 0 
Briefly mentioned (just produced a statement of commitment), 1 
Detailed coverage of commitment including future goals and 
strategies, 2 
B Determine if the minerals 
originate in the DRC or its 
neighbouring countries 
0-2 4 If source or origin of  minerals is  ‘undeterminable’, 0 
If source or origin of minerals is ‘party determinable’ and ‘party 
undeterminable’, 1 
If all sources are determinable, 2. 
C Exercise due diligence based 
on an approved framework 
(such as the OECD due 
diligence guidance) to 
determine the origin of the 
minerals  
0-2 6 If no due diligence framework is reported, 0 
If there is reference to a due diligence framework (for example, the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance, see 
www.OECD.daf/investment/mining)  (minimal description), 1 
If details of the process is provided and checklist/benchmark against 
best practice guidance such as the OECD due diligence guidance, 2 
D Evidence/examples of 
communications with 
suppliers regarding due 
diligence expectations   
0-2 8 No example, 0 
One example, 1 
More than one examples, 2 
E Evidence of any risk 
management and associated  
performance including a 
description of the time 
frame for improvement  
0-2 10 No discussion  of risk management, 0 
Reference to risk management and associated strategy, 1 
Details of how risk has been (is) managed and related improvement, 2 
F Amount of money (cost 
information) spent in an 
attempt to eliminate the use 
of conflict minerals in the 
supply chain 
0-2 12 No disclosure of cost associated with the use and/or elimination of 
conflict minerals, 0 
Disclosure of current aggregate amount spent to reduce the use of 
conflict minerals, 1 
Disclosure of details of current period expenditure by segments, 
country, or major suppliers,  and/or, disclosure of expenditure detail 
of past and present with estimated cost for the future period through 
comparative statements, 2 
G Number of suppliers 
involved with conflict 
minerals and reduction of 
these 
0-2 14 No disclosure of number of suppliers with conflict minerals,  0 
Reference total number of suppliers with conflict minerals, 1 
Details of improvement (i.e., reduction) in the number of suppliers 
with conflict minerals compared to previous year, and/or, year-wise 
comparative data in the reduction of suppliers with conflict minerals 
with future targets, 2 
H Evidence of regular 
monitoring of supply chains 
to minimise the use of 
conflict minerals  
0-2 16 No mention of monitoring of supply chains, 0 
Statement of regular monitoring without improvement (of 
performance) data, 1  
Details of regular monitoring with improvement data and statistics, 2 
I Conducting conflict mineral 
audits and associated 
reporting  
0-2 18 If there is no audit, 0 
If the conflict mineral report is audited only by an internal auditor, 1 
If the conflict mineral report is audited by a third party, 2 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the elements of the disclosures on conflict minerals 
   








A Management commitment to reduce the use 
of conflict minerals in the supply chain 
0.00 2.00 1.230 0.501 2.00 61.50% 
B Determine if the minerals originate in the 
DRC or its neighbouring countries 
0.00 2.00 0.261 0.457 2.00 13.05% 
C Exercise due diligence based on an approved 
framework (such as OECD due diligence 
guidance) to determine the origin of the 
minerals  
0.00 2.00 1.108 0.561 2.00 55.40% 
D Evidence/examples of communications with 
suppliers regarding due diligence 
expectations   
0.00 2.00 0.254 0.454 2.00 12.70% 
E Evidence of any risk management and 
associated performance including a 
description of the time frame for 
improvement  
0.00 2.00 0.913 0.391 2.00 45.65% 
F Amount of money (cost information) spent in 
an attempt to eliminate conflict minerals in 
the supply chain 
0.00 1.00 0.029 0.168 2.00 1.45% 
G Number of suppliers involved with conflict 
minerals and reduction of these 
0.00 2.00 0.381 0.664 2.00 19.05% 
H Evidence of regular monitoring of supply 
chains to minimise the use of conflict 
minerals  
0.00 2.00 0.950 0.387 2.00 47.50% 
I Conducting conflict mineral audits and 
associated reporting  
0.00 2.00 0.619 0.896 2.00 30.95% 
 Total Disclosure Score 1.00 12.00 5.727 2.461 18.00 31.82% 
 
Note: This table shows the actual scores allocated to each category and in total. The last column show a percentage score 





Table 3: Summary of Variables 
Variable Designation Source Calculation 
Comprehensiveness 
of disclosures 
Disclosure Hand- collected from 
conflict mineral reports 
filed with the SEC 
Disclosure score determined using a 
disclosure index (see Table 1) being a 
percentage calculated using the actual 




NGOCollab Hand-collected from the 
company reports, 
websites, conflict mineral 
reports and collaborator 
NGO online resources  
Reflects the number of collaborations 
a company had during the year with a 
social movement NGO (with regards to 
conflict minerals).  
Activist protest  Protest Media articles from the 
Dow Jones Factiva 
database and the Business 
and Human Rights 
Resource Centre (BHRRC) 
The number of protest events based 
on a keyword search using ‘protest’, 
‘boycott’, ‘demonstration’, ‘campaign’, 
‘NGO’, ‘activist’, ‘human rights’, 
‘conflict minerals’, and ‘supply chains’ 
as keywords 
CSR Performance CSRPerf Bloomberg Data CSR performance using the ESG 
measure from Bloomberg.  The ESG 
score ranges from 0 to 100 and is 
designed to capture actual CSR 
performance, rather than just policies 
and intentions 
Size measure SIZE Bloomberg Data Natural log of total assets 
Return on Assets ROA Bloomberg Data Net profit before tax over average 
total assets 
Leverage LEV Bloomberg Data Financial leverage being average total 
assets over average total common 
equity  
Tobin’s Q TOBIN Q Bloomberg Data (Market Capitalization + Total 
Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority 
Interest) / Total Assets 
Volatility measure VOLAT Bloomberg Data Share price volatility being the 
standard deviation of day to day 
logarithmic historical price changes. 
The 360-day price volatility equals the 
annualized standard deviation of the 
relative price change for the 360 most 
recent trading days’ closing price, 
expressed as a percentage. 




Cons Discr  
Bloomberg Data. All 
industry classifications are 
based on the GICS 
classifications.  
Info Tech is the Information 
Technology and Tele-communication 
industry.  
Industrials is the Industrial industry. 
Healthcare is the Healthcare industry.  
Cons Discr is the consumer discretion 
industry.  
Country variable USA, Europe, 
Japan, Rest of 
the world 
Forbes Global 2000 Shows whether a company is 
registered in the USA, Europe, Japan or 
the rest of the world (countries with 





Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std dev 
Disclosure 139 31.82% 25.00% 5.55% 66.67% 12.30% 
NGOCollab 139 0.75 0.00 0 3 0.86 
Protest 139 1.31 0.00 0 24 2.88 
CSRPerf 133 35.99 35.95 5.37 83.06 17.14 
SIZE 139 50,497,294 15,930,970 1,685,490 656,560,000 89,992,818 
ROA 139 8.08 6.82 -9.34 67.31 8.50 
LEV 139 3.06 2.14 1.13 47.13 4.29 
TOBIN Q 139 1.89 1.69 0.85 6.35 0.90 
VOLAT 139 25.54 24.08 13.78 56.08 8.65 
 
Notes: Disclosure is the disclosure score being a percentage calculated using the actual score over the potential total score. 
NGOCollab is the extent of collaboration with NGOs. Protest is the number of protest events based on Factiva and BHRRC. 
CSRPerf is the CSR performance using the ESG measure from Bloomberg. SIZE is total assets in US$. ROA is return on 
assets. LEV is financial leverage. TOBIN Q is Tobin’s Q. VOLAT is share price volatility. Missing data caused N for 





Table 5: Correlations 
 Disclosure NGOCollab Protest CollabxProt CSRPerf SIZE ROA LEV TOBIN Q VOLAT Info Tech Industrials 
Disclosure - 0.569** 0.444** 0.564** 0.139 0.023 0.001 -0.089 0.088 0.199* 0.239** 0.026 
NGOCollab 0.573** - 0.299** 0.640** 0.132 0.027 -0.076 0.015 0.038 0.238** 0.259** 0.022 
Protest 0.387** 0.281** - 0.717** 0.487** 0.493** -0.161 0.091 -0.215* 0.096 0.220** 0.031 
CollabxProt 0.425** 0.434** 0.876** - 0.330** 0.275** -0.041 0.039 -0.040 0.054 0.211* 0.039 
CSRPerf 0.168 0.147 0.357** 0.233** - 0.648** -0.238** 0.129 -0.310** -0.088 0.103 0.023 
SIZE 0.041 0.070 0.416** 0.286** 0.604** - -0.285** 0.166 -0.368** -0.276** -0.105 0.132 
ROA 0.017 -0.074 -0.028 0.013 -0.291** -0.318** - -0.435** 0.695** -0.249** -0.025 -0.004 
LEV -0.067 0.072 -0.012 -0.002 0.071 0.108 -0.103 - -0.271** 0.026 -0.150 0.220** 
TOBIN Q 0.051 0.028 -0.096 -0.018 -0.305** -0.419** 0.395** -0.075 - -0.287* -0.046 0.086 
VOLAT 0.210* 0.247** 0.181* 0.175* -0.002 -0.226** -0.065 0.049 -0.238** - 0.281** -0.327** 
Info Tech 0.225** 0.243** 0.217* 0.171* 0.101 -0.116 0.061 0.037 -0.017 0.249** - -0.430** 
Industrials 0.058 0.017 -0.021 -0.006 0.013 0.115 -0.057 0.046 -0.008 -0.279** -0.430** - 
Energy -0.254** -0.292** -0.109 -0.107 0.096 0.213* -0.041 -0.070 -0.146 -0.110 -0.360** -0.166 
Healthcare -0.107 -0.204* -0.133 -0.092 -0.127 -0.147 0.012 -0.081 0.094 -0.182* -0.348** -0.161 
Cons Discr -0.052 0.103 -0.070 -0.058 -0.146 -0.025 0.002 0.041 0.094 0.229** -0.348** -0.161 
USA 0.101 -0.036 -0.088 -0.012 -0.288** -0.206* 0.081 -0.091 0.246** -0.161 -0.117 0.053 
Europe -0.001 0.027 0.087 0.053 0.187* 0.182* -0.009 0.158 -0.092 -0.007 0.036 -0.007 
Japan -0.020 0.061 -0.011 -0.031 0.089 0.196* -0.137 -0.009 -0.184* 0.140 -0.063 0.001 
Rest of the 
world 






Table 5 - Correlations (continued) 
  Energy Healthcare Cons Discr USA Europe Japan Rest  
Disclosure -0.262** -0.093 -0.042 0.113 -0.016 -0.019 -0.146 
NGOCollab -0.302** -0.208* 0.087 -0.029 0.010 0.070 -0.015 
Protest -0.165 -0.174* -0.037 -0.166 0.131 -0.011 0.100 
CollabxProt -0.222** -0.130 -0.018 0.036 -0.014 -0.038 -0.013 
CSRPerf 0.080 -0.119 -0.153 -0.295** 0.208* 0.100 0.128 
SIZE 0.192* -0.138 -0.048 -0.210* 0.196* 0.176* -0.046 
ROA 0.010 0.089 -0.054 0.215* -0.112 -0.243** -0.027 
LEV -0.093 -0.092 0.166 -0.045 0.094 0.014 -0.062 
TOBIN Q -0.147 0.187* -0.065 0.285** -0.055 -0.270** -0.195* 
VOLAT -0.099 -0.210* 0.252** -0.170* -0.050 0.161 0.225** 
Info Tech -0.360** -0.348** -0.348** -0.117 0.036 -0.063 0.185* 
Industrials -0.166 -0.161 -0.161 0.053 -0.007 0.001 -0.077 
Energy - -0.135 -0.135 0.065 0.054 -0.079 -0.120 
Healthcare -0.135 - -0.130 0.149 -0.052 -0.077 -0.116 
Cons Discr -0.135 -0.130 - -0.094 -0.052 0.256** 0.039 
USA 0.065 0.149 -0.094 - -0.688** -0.312** -0.472** 
Europe 0.054 -0.052 -0.052 -0.688** - -0.099 -0.150 
Japan -0.079 -0.077 0.256** -0.312** -0.099 - -0.068 
Rest of the world -0.120 -0.116 0.039 -0.472** -0.150 -0.068 - 
  
Notes: All variables are explained in Table 3. 






Table 6 Means comparisons 




(N = 65) 
No Collaboration 
Mean 
(N = 74) 
t-stat 
Disclosure 36.154 22.027       8.225*** 
Protest 1.95 0.74       2.519*** 
CSR Performance 38.020 34.163 1.229 
    




(N = 69) 
Below average 
Mean 
(N = 70) 
t-stat 
Collaboration 0.72 0.21       6.961*** 
Protest 2.07 0.56       3.202*** 
CSR Performance 38.075 33.996 1.374 
    




(N = 95) 
Non US 
Mean 
(N = 44) 
t-stat 
Disclosure 29.474 26.818 1.163 
Collaboration 0.46 0.48 -0.154 
Protest 1.14 1.68 -1.037 
CSR Performance 32.711 43.349       -3.409*** 
 









Coefficient  p-value 
NGOCollab (+) 19.433  0.000*** 
Protest (+) 9.244  0.015** 
NGOCollabXProtest 0.769  0.017** 
CSRPerf 0.022  0.753 
SIZE -0.659  0.595 
ROA 0.296  0.035** 
LEV -0.358  0.087* 
TOBIN Q -1.361  0.320 
VOLAT -0.123  0.431 
Industrials 2.544  0.371 
Energy 6.400  0.108 
Healthcare 6.358  0.067* 
Cons Discr -5.241  0.103 
Europe -1.973  0.420 
Japan -1.610  0.735 
Rest -7.285  0.050** 
Constant 22.916  0.114 
N 131   
Adj. R2 0.3487   
 
Notes: All variables have been defined in Tables 3 and 4.  





Appendix 1: Description of major NGO collaborators  
EICC (Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition), founded in 2004 is a Washington based non-profit 
alliance of electronics, retail, auto and toy companies committed to protecting the rights of workers 
and communities worldwide affected by the global electronics supply chain. While the activities of 
the EICC have gone beyond compliance, standard setting, training and capacity building, 
accountability and transparency remain a core EICC activity. In the collaboration continuum (Austin, 
2000), EICC appears an intensive and engaged alliance to create change in supply chain transparency. 
GeSI (Global e-sustainability Initiative) is a Brussels based alliance and the leading source for 
impartial and credible information on emerging issues in the area of Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) and the development of human rights guidance for the ICT sector. It is engaged in 
efforts to promote human rights and ensure that ICT products do not contain “conflict minerals”. In 
the collaboration continuum (Austin, 2000), GeSI’s collaboration is at policy and thought level 
(standard setting level) and less intensive and less engaged than EICC’s collaboration in achieving 
transparency and accountability in the global supply chains. 
CFSI (Conflict- Free Sourcing Initiatives), a Washington based global alliance founded in 2008, have 
grown into one of the most utilized and respected resources for companies from a range of industries 
addressing conflict mineral issues in their supply chains. Over 350 companies collaborate with the 
CFSI, contributing to a range of activities and resources i.e., the ‘Conflict-Free Smelter Program’, 
‘Field Visits’, ‘Conflict Minerals Reporting Template’, ‘Reasonable Country of Origin Inquiry data’, 
Monitoring’, ‘Check Compliances’ and a range of guidance documents on conflict mineral sourcing. 
Through its Conflict-Free Smelter Program, CFSI offers companies and their suppliers conflict 
mineral disclosure guidance and independent, third-party, monitoring that determines which smelters 
and refiners can be validated as “conflict-free”.  CFSI engages with a variety of other NGOs, 
responsible investor groups, governments and multilateral institutions to discuss emerging issues, best 
practices and work on addressing shared challenges.  In terms of the collaboration notion, CFSI 
appears to be a more engaged, more specific, more intensive and more interactive collaborator 
(Rondinelli and London, 2003; Mandell, 1999; Austin, 2000) than any other NGO collaborator 
considered in this study.  
AIAG (Automotive Industry Action Group) is a US based not-for-profit association founded in 1982, 
to collaborate with a diverse group of stakeholders to streamline industry processes via global 
standards development and harmonized business practices, including responsible supply chain 
practices. In collaboration with corporations, it takes progressive steps to demonstrate its commitment 
to the elimination of conflict minerals, and develop resources to assist with the conflict mineral 
compliance process. Compared to other NGO collaborators considered in this study, AIAG provides 
general, less intensive and less engaged collaborations with companies in an attempt to eliminate 
human rights concerns in the conflict mineral zones. 
